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Risk-shifting, Equity Risk, and the Distress Puzzle 
Abstract 
Higher default probabilities are associated with lower future stock returns. The anomaly cannot be 
explained by strategic shareholder actions, traditional risk factors, characteristics, or mispricing, but, 
instead, is consistent with a risk-shifting hypothesis. Consistent with the risk-shifting hypothesis, we find 
that distressed firms tend to overinvest, destroy value, and exhaust their cash flows. Effects are 
concentrated in firms with wide credit spreads, firms with no convertible debt, and in cases where CEOs 
receive above-average equity-based compensation. As default risk rises, credit spreads rise, equity betas 
fall, and equity returns fall.   
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1. Introduction 
 Financial distress risk is commonly cited as an underlying cause of several stock return anomalies. In 
a rational market, investors should demand higher premiums for holding stocks with higher distress risk. 
However, studies show returns are lower for firms with high distress risk (Griffin and Lemmon (2002) 
and Campbell et al. (2008)). Behavioral explanations of the “distress risk puzzle” focus on market 
mispricing — investors underestimate the implications of high distress risk, and, consequently, fail to 
demand appropriate risk premiums.   
 In contrast, the distress risk anomaly might be explained by more complex mechanisms related to the 
agency theory of debt. In particular, Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) offer a risk-shifting hypothesis in 
which managers of financially distressed firms maximize the limited liability option of shareholders by 
accepting excessive risk, whereby distressed firms invest in risk-increasing projects offering improbable 
high pay-offs at the expense of bondholders. Distressed firms generally have abnormally large leverage 
ratios and proportions of equity that are small relative to their capital structure. Shareholders are likely to 
lose as high interest payments detract from cash flows. Even trivial shocks to a firm’s cash flows may 
result in default. In these situations, shareholders have little to lose, and, therefore, prefer management to 
accept risky projects. When these projects are successful, shareholders repay the bondholders and retain 
the surplus. Conversely, when these projects fail, shareholder downside risks are limited to their stake in 
the firm upon bankruptcy. As a result, risky projects undertaken by distressed firms lead to a transfer of 
risk from shareholders to bondholders.  
 Prior literature related to risk-shifting behavior predominately focuses on the mechanisms that may 
reduce agency conflicts from a theoretical standpoint.1 There is very little empirical evidence whether the 
problem actually exists. Gilje (2016) finds that firms reduce investment risk as they approach financial 
distress, disputing the risk-shifting hypothesis. Diamond (1989) and Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) 
                                                 
1 Theoretical work related to the risk shifting hypothesis includes: Smith and Warner (1979), Barnea et al. (1980, 
1981), Green (1984), and John and John (1993).  
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suggest that managers may avoid risk shifting behavior due to reputational concerns. Similarly, Almeida 
et al. (2012) suggest risk-shifting behavior could be trumped by concerns regarding the ability to fund 
future projects. Hernández-Lagos et al. (2016) conduct experiments that provide evidence of both risk-
shifting behavior and reputational concerns. These studies add to our understanding of risk-shifting 
behavior – but offer conflicting evidence. We add to the literature by investigating the relationship 
between risk-shifting behavior and distress risk.  
 Previous studies relate risk-shifting behavior with liquidation costs. Specifically, risk-shifting 
behavior is more likely when shareholder advantages and bargaining powers inflate liquidation costs for 
distressed firms. Alderson and Betker (1996) provide direct estimates of liquidation costs for a sample of 
bankrupt firms and study their association with a number of commonly used proxies. They conclude that 
fixed assets, market-to-book ratio, and R&D expenses are the best variables to use to proxy for liquidation 
costs. Similarly, Garlappi et al. (2008) and Garlappi and Yan (2011) contend that strategic actions by 
shareholders during distressed firm debt renegotiation might explain the distress puzzle. In particular, 
Garlappi et al. (2008) argue default probabilities for distressed firms do not adequately capture equity 
risks associated with default, especially for firms with strong shareholder advantage. The authors define 
shareholder advantage as shareholder’ capacities to take advantage of other claimholders. Shareholder 
advantage is proxied by asset size, R&D intensity, and liquidation cost, and is expected to be high for 
large firms with lower R&D costs and higher liquidation costs (proxied by asset specificity variables such 
as the Herfindahl industry concentration index and the Berger et al. (1996) asset tangibility measure). 
Garlappi et al. (2008) show that shareholders actions can reduce the effective leverage of equity such that, 
when default probability is high, equity risk and expected returns are lower for firms with greater 
shareholder advantage.   
 In their study of risk-shifting behavior, Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) examine shareholder 
bargaining powers. Bargaining power is higher for more obscure firms that are not followed by credit 
rating agencies, do not have convertible debt, and firms in which the CEO holds equity. Notably, the 
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authors show standard proxies for risk-shifting behavior explain very little of the cross-sectional variation 
of corporate bond prices.  
 We find distress risk is a robust and negative predictor of future stock returns even after controlling 
for the effects of strategic shareholder actions. The negative relation is not concentrated in the post-1980s 
period, is not sample specific, and is not due to different proxies for distress risk. The relation is less 
likely caused by mispricing issues, as event-time analyses show persistent underperformance patterns and 
lower equity returns for high default risk firms. Our analysis demonstrates that the distress effect cannot 
be explained by strategic shareholder actions, traditional risk factors, stock characteristics, or mispricing.  
 Our results are consistent with a risk-shifting hypothesis. Three major findings support this claim. 
First, high default firms overinvest, earn low profits, and exhaust their cash flow. These effects are 
concentrated in low-growth-opportunity firms and in hard-to-value firms. Second, distress effects are 
concentrated in firms without a credit rating or convertible debt and in firms where CEOs hold equity, all 
of which are consistent with effects of strategic actions of shareholders. Third, high distress firms tend to 
exhibit higher credit spreads, lower equity betas, and lower stock returns, even after controlling for stock 
and bond characteristics and shareholder strategic action effects. 
2.  Data and estimation 
 We use Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) daily and monthly stock files and 
COMPUSTAT quarterly and annual research files of firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. 
Unless otherwise noted, the sample period ranges from January 1971 to December 2014. As noted in 
Campbell et al. (2008), bankruptcies were extremely infrequent until the late 1960s. We eliminate 
financial and utility companies, as these firms have restricted capital structures. Many studies remove 
stocks with prices of less than $5 to reduce market microstructure issues, but low-priced stocks tend to 
have much higher default probabilities. Therefore, to reduce effects of liquidity and other market 
microstructure complications yet maintain otherwise legitimate high risk observations, we only exclude 
stocks with prices less than $1. To be included in the analysis, firms are required to have at least 36 
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monthly observations. We conduct our analysis with quarterly accounting data from COMPUSTAT and 
monthly stock market data from CRSP.   
 We use corporate bond yield data for July 2002 to December 2014 drawn from the TRACE (Trade 
Reporting and Compliance Engine) database. These data include FINRA over-the-counter (OTC) 
corporate bond market real-time prices, as well as details on all eligible corporate bonds including 
investment grade, high yield, and convertible debt. TRACE represents 100% of OTC activity and over 
99% of total U.S. corporate bond market activity. We also use ExecuComp data on executive stock and 
option holdings and on CEO characteristics. 
2.1. Default probability 
 We use the default probability measure presented in Campbell et al. (2008). Following their methods, 
we combine quarterly accounting data from COMPUSTAT with monthly stock market data from CRSP 
by lagging two months in the accounting data. We estimate time-varying distress probabilities (DP) using 
the Campbell et al. (2008) “best” model:  
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where Φ = 2-1/3. The weights are constant in each quarter for NIMTAAVG and in each month for 
EXRETAVG. EXRET equals ln(1+ stock return) minus ln(1 + market return). The proxy for the 
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market is the value-weighted market index maintained by CRSP. When the lagged EXRET is missing, 
we substitute the cross-sectional average. NIMTA equals net income divided by the market value of 
total assets (market value of equity plus book value of liabilities). If the market value is missing, we 
use the product of prices per share and shares outstanding from the last month of CRSP data from the 
quarter in lieu of the total market value. TLMTA equals total liabilities divided by market value of 
total assets. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily returns over last three months. RSIZE is the 
relative size measured as the log ratio of firm market capitalization to that of the market. CASHMTA 
is calculated as cash and short term investments, divided by market value of total assets. Finally, 
PRICE equals the log price per share.2 
 There are two advantages to using the dynamic logit (hazard model) rather than the option-pricing 
based model. First, the hazard model utilizes observable and readily available accounting or market data. 
The relatively low-cost and easily accessible data can be accurately implemented without delays or 
complications. Second, the hazard model does not rely on an assumptions of the absence of arbitrage 
opportunities and market frictions. In reality, arbitrage opportunities exist and market frictions are 
prominent. When basic assumptions are violated, noise is introduced into default risk measures estimated 
from option pricing models, such as the market-based expected default frequency.3 Incremental benefits 
of using the hazard model are described in in Campbell et al. (2008), who find higher pseudo-R2 statistics 
for their best model both in-sample and out-of-sample in the hazard model vis-a-vis the option pricing-
based model.  
 Table 1 presents mean values of default probability and historical events associated with abnormal 
upsurges in average default probability by year. For the 44-year sample period, 31 years show an average 
                                                 
 2 Following Campbell et al. (2008), we winsorize price per share at $15 before taking logarithms because 
exploratory analysis indicates prices are relevant below $15. This truncation is not applied when calculating stock 
returns. 




default probability over 0.1%, and the majority of the spikes are related to financial crises. Average 
default probability values are much higher during the two most recent crises. The average default 
probability of the dot-com bubble in 2001 is 1.80% and that of the 2008 U.S. financial crisis is 6.63%. In 
contrast, the average default probability of the secondary banking crisis in 1976 is 0.03% and that of the 
1981 Latin American debt crisis is 0.05%.4  
2.2. Time-varying betas 
 We employ two approaches to estimate time-varying betas, which are updated monthly. First, we use 
the time-varying beta methodology presented in Lewellen and Nagel (2006). We use rolling regressions 
of daily returns from the CRSP daily stock file using a standard market model rit = αi + βi rmt + εit, with 
rolling windows of 12 months. The use of a 12-month window is advantageous in that sufficient 
observations are available for each regression.5 This increases the precision of coefficient estimations 
without compromising the benefits of using a time-varying beta, allowing us to generate equity risk 
estimates based on pre-formation data.  
 Second, we use a version of Avramov and Chordia’s (2006) conditional model. Ferguson and 
Shockley (2003) show estimates of beta using an equity-only proxy for the market portfolio can lead to a 
downward bias. To correct these errors, equity beta estimates should incorporate firm-specific variables 
that correlate with relative distress or relative leverage patterns. Further, Avramov and Chordia (2006) 
show that relative to traditional betas, conditional betas are better able to capture explain the variation in 
cross-sectional returns. Along these lines, Zhang (2005) relates equity beta to firm characteristics such as 
the book-to-market ratio. Motivated by these findings, we employ a time-varying rolling regression of 
daily returns in the following model: 
                                                 
 4 Default probability in our paper is slightly lower than that shown in Campbell et al. (2008), as we eliminate 
lower priced stocks and financial firms.   
 5 We require at least 50 daily observations over the 12-month estimation period.  
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where rit is the daily stock return, rft is the daily return on the 30-day Treasury bill, αi is the intercept, βi,m 
is the unconditional beta relative to market excess returns, and the conditional beta equals βi,m +  
βi,BMBMi,t-1.  
|Please insert Table 1| 
2.3. Summary statistics 
 Table 2 provides summary statistics of firm-level characteristics, stock returns, and equity betas. The 
sample includes approximately 1 million firm-month observations with complete data. The data span the 
period January 1971 – December 2014. Panel A presents the distribution of firm characteristics. Panel B 
reports averages for firm characteristics by default probability quintile. Panel C reports means for stock 
returns and equity risk (equity beta) by default probability quintile.6 
|Please insert Table 2| 
 For each month, observations are sorted by default probability levels into quintiles. Time-series 
averages of the cross-sectional means are presented for each variable. Size is the natural log of market 
capitalization in millions (at end of year t-1). BM is the book-to-market ratio, which is calculated as the 
book value of stockholder equity at year t-1 divided by the market value of stockholder equity at the end 
of year t-1. These variables are matched with monthly returns from July of year t to June of year t+1. 
MOM is stock momentum, defined as stock returns over the prior year ranging from -12 months to -2 
months. All variables are calculated following Daniel et al. (1997). Illiquidity denotes Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity measure for the past 12 months of daily trading. Leverage denotes total liabilities over total 
assets. For each month, we match monthly return data from CRSP data to the firm’s quarterly 2-month 
                                                 
6 In the multivariate tests and those that follow, we repeated our analysis using the Naïve Distance to Default measure 
proposed by Bharath and Shumway (2008) to construct the portfolio rankings. The correlation of the portfolio rankings 
with the procedure employed in this paper is 0.70. Thus, it is no surprise that we find the results to be qualitatively 
similar to those presented in this study. For specific results, please see our online appendix. 
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lagged default probability. We measure future returns as t+1 month returns following portfolio formation. 
For delisted observations, we follow Shumway and Warther (1999) by replacing the delisted return with 
the prior month’s returns or with the median of delisting returns. 
 As shown in Panel A of Table 2, the average default probability is 1.055% and the median is 0.002%. 
The positive skewness in the default probability distribution is confirmed in Panel B.  Only the highest 
default quintiles show an average default probability of over one percent. BM is positively and related to 
default probability, which is especially noteworthy given the widespread use of BM as a proxy for distress 
risk. Results also indicate that default risk is negatively related to momentum, positively related to 
leverage (consistent with George and Hwang (2010)), and positively related to illiquidity (consistent with 
Garlappi and Yan (2011)).   
 Panel C of Table 2 presents results for returns and equity risk by default quintile. Results are derived 
for excess returns (stock return minus the risk-free rate), Daniel et al. (1997) and Wermers (2004) 
characteristic-adjusted returns, and Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), and Fama and French (2015) 
multi-factor alphas. 7 All returns show a general downward trend across the default quintiles, consistent 
with the distress risk puzzle. Annualized long-short strategies for default quintiles 1 and 5 equal 8.02% 
and 3.70% for excess returns and characteristic-adjusted returns, respectively. And, analogous long-short 
alphas equal 9.76%, 6.92%, and 7.72%, for the 3-factor, 4-factor, and 5-factor alphas, respectively. The 
bottom two rows report time-varying betas. Our results show that betas decline across default quintiles. 
Overall, these results are consistent with a risk shifting hypothesis in which equity risk and equity returns 
are negatively related to distress risk. We discuss these results in greater detail when discussing the risk-
shifting proposition.  
 
                                                 
 7 The matching procedure is based on cutoffs of size, the book-to-market ratio, and momentum characteristics 
drawn from Professor Russ Wermer’s web page: http://alex2.umd.edu/wermers/ftpsite/Dgtw/coverpage.htm. 
The data for the characteristics tests in our paper span the period June 1975 – December 2012.  
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3. Empirical Tests 
3.1. Firm fundamentals and distress risk   
 According to the risk-shifting proposition, managers of distressed firms tend to accept risky projects 
at a cost to bondholders. Shareholders benefit if the investments are successful, and bondholders bear the 
cost if investments fail. Existing literature suggests conditions under which risk-shifting is likely to occur 
– for firms with greater growth opportunities (Eisdorfer (2008)) and for hard-to-value firms (Ang et al. 
(2006)). To investigate the effects of growth opportunities and valuation difficulties, we examine 
investment intensity, profitability, and cash flow fundamentals of companies in high and low default risk 
quintiles, segmented by market-to-book ratio (MB) and by idiosyncratic risk (IR). MB proxies for growth 
opportunities. Eisdorfer (2008) contends that growth opportunities pose agency conflicts between 
shareholders and bondholders, and, therefore, firms with greater growth opportunities are more likely to 
exhibit risk-shifting behavior. IR proxies for valuation uncertainty. Ang et al. (2006) contend that hard-to-
value firms can hide their risk-shifting behavior, thereby avoiding high debt-issuance costs. In contrast, 
transparent firms are likely to be constrained by debt covenants or regulations that mitigate agency 
problems related to debt. Hard-to-value firms and firms with high growth opportunities tend to be 
characterized by high levels of IR and MB, respectively. 
 Table 3 reports time-series averages for investment intensity, profitability, and cash flow intensity 
separately for low and high default quintiles. Investment intensity is defined as capital expenditure 
divided by total assets. Firm profitability is measured by ROE (net income divided by shareholder equity), 
and, as before, Cash Flow is operating cash flow divided by total assets. For each year, observations are 
sorted into quintiles based on default probability from the previous year (Panel A), and further subdivided 
by MB and IR (Panels B and C, respectively).  
|Please insert Table 3| 
 In Panel A, results show that the default probability is positively associated with investment intensity 
and is negatively associated with profitability and cash flow. Average investment intensity equals 6.3% 
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for low default risk firms and 7.1% for high default risk firms.8 The difference is statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. The average ROE for low default risk firms is 15.7% and that of the high default risk firms 
is -17.4%. The difference is -33.0%, significant at the 0.01 level. This supports the risk-shifting 
hypothesis principle that managers of high default risk firms engage in value-destroying or negative NPV 
investment decisions. The difference in cash flow levels provides additional evidence of risk-shifting 
behavior. The average cash flow level of the low default quintile is positive at 27.6% and that of the high 
default quintile is 9.1%. The difference is -18.5%, significant at the 0.01 level.  
 Panel B presents the results of risk-shifting behaviors controlling for MB. Results show investment 
intensity is nearly identical for high and low default firms, after controlling for MB. The results are 
consistent with the Eisdorfer’s (2008) real options hypothesis that investment decisions depend on growth 
opportunities. When growth opportunities are similar between low and high default firms, investment 
intensity also is similar. In contrast, investment intensity is significantly greater for high MB firms versus 
low MB firms for both low and high default firms (differences of -2.8% in both cases).  
 For high-growth opportunity firms, the distinction between high and low default risk firms should be 
based on the quality of investments and on marginal resources used for investing. According to the risk-
shifting hypothesis, high default risk companies invest in all projects, including negative NPV projects, 
resulting in lower average return on investments. Consistent with the risk-shifting hypothesis, Panel B of 
Table 3 shows, on average, high MB low default risk firms earn an ROE of 19.4%, and high MB high 
default risk firms earn -47.2%. While the difference in ROEs between low and high default firms for the 
low MB group is negative, the difference is much smaller than the high MB group: -19.7% versus -66.6%, 
respectively. Results also show that cash flow intensity is significantly less for high default firms and the 
difference is slightly more exaggerated for high MB firms (-14.6% for low MB firms versus -18.6% for 
high MB firms).  
                                                 
 8 For simplicity, we refer to firms in the low (high) default risk quintile as low (high) default risk firms.  
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 Table 3, Panel C presents the results conditioned on default risk and IR. Relative to low IR firms, high 
IR firms earn lower ROEs (differences of -9.7% for low default firms and -50.1% for high default firms), 
but maintain larger cash flow (differences of 9.9% for low default risk firms and 3.0% for high default 
risk firms). Differences in ROEs between low and high default firms are much larger for high IR firms 
(-16% for low IR firms versus -50.4% for high IR firms), highlighting the relevance of firm profitability 
relative to firm transparency especially for distressed firms. Interestingly, ROE is positive for high default 
firms with low IR. These results offer evidence that risk-shifting behaviors and agency problems are 
mitigated in more transparent firms.    
 Overall, the results indicate that managers of high default firms tend to overinvest, destroy value, and 
exhaust their cash flow. Consistent with the risk-shifting proposition, differences in ROEs are more 
pronounced for firms with high MB and IR. Therefore, high default firms with greater growth prospects 
and hard-to-value firms are more likely to be characterized by risk-shifting behavior.9 Figure 1 presents 
the 5-year moving average of the Investment Intensity, ROE, and Cash Flow for the Low and High 
Default Portfolios over time. The figure highlights the persistence of risk-shifting behavior over time.   
3.2. Cross-sectional tests controlling for shareholder actions 
 We design tests to measure the effects of distress risk after controlling for multi-factor model risks 
and proxies for shareholder actions. We conduct Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional tests with shareholder 
strategic action proxies including TANGIBILITY, MBTA, and CURRENT, as recommended and derived 
by Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) in their study of the strategic actions of borrowers and lenders. 
TANGIBILITY is defined as one minus the ratio of net property, plant and equipment divided by book 
value of total assets. MBTA is the sum of the book value of debt plus the market value of equity divided 
by the book value of total assets. CURRENT is the ratio of current-to-total debt.10 To alleviate skewness 
                                                 
 9 We also conducted Table 3 tests after adjusting industry-adjusting all data. No substantive differences were 
obtained from the industry-adjusted results. For specific results please see our online appendix.   
 10 Other strategic action proxies are excluded for data availability reasons or because they are likely to have similar 
indications as those presented in the risk-shifting hypothesis. For example, the shareholder advantage hypothesis 
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problems in default probability levels, we use the distress quintile (DR) as a proxy for distress risk — 
which takes a value ranging from one (when a firm occupies the lowest default quintile) through five 
(when a firm occupies the highest default quintile). To control for peripheral effects, we include the 
following firm characteristics: Size, BM, MOM for tests conducted on equity returns and Cash Flow, 
Cash, Sales Growth, R&D, and DY for tests conducted on equity risk. As defined earlier, Cash Flow 
equals operating cash flow divided by total assets. Cash denotes cash and short-term investments divided 
by total assets. Sales growth is the average percent change in sales over the prior three years. R&D 
denotes research and development expenditures divided by total assets. DY denotes the dividend yield, 
equal to most recent year dividends per share divided by the end-of-month share price. 
 Results of the monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions are reported in Table 4. In Panel A, the dependent 
variable consists of individual stock excess returns (stock return minus the 1-month Treasury bill return), 
and in Panel B, the dependent variable consists of the individual stock time-varying betas. For each 
dependent variable, we report the results of five specifications: (1) DR; (2) DR and controls; (3) DR, 
TANGIBILITY, and controls; (4) DR, MBTA, and controls; and (5) DR, CURRENT, and controls. Newey-
West adjusted standard errors are used for all t-tests. These specifications are designed to determine 
whether distress effects have incremental explanatory power after controlling for the effects of stock 
characteristics and shareholder strategic actions.11  
|Please insert Table 4| 
 Consistent with the prior literature, we find a significant relation between distress risk and subsequent 
return. Distress risk is a significant and negative predictor of returns - monthly excess returns change 18.4 
                                                 
argues that the fraction of equity owned by a firm’s CEO represents equity bargaining power, while the risk-shifting 
hypothesis interprets the fraction as the degree of alliance between managers and shareholders.   
 11 We replicated our analysis using the Ohlsen (1980) “best model” O-score. Results are similar to those reported 
in Table 4. For the full model specification, the DR slope is negative and significant for the tests on equity returns and 
equity risk. The DR slope estimates equal -0.167 (t-statistic = -6.22) for the equity returns test and -0.024 (t-statistic 
= -3.30) for the equity risk test. For specific results see our online appendix. 
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basis points for every 1-unit change in default quintile classification. Therefore, on average, stocks in the 
lowest default quintile earn 73.6 basis points per month or 9.2% annually, more than stocks in the highest 
default quintile. Alternative specifications confirm similar results after controlling for firm characteristics 
and strategic action proxies. These results show that the distress risk anomaly remains after controlling for 
size, book-to-market, and momentum characteristics, as well as proxies designed to capture the effects of 
shareholder actions.  
 Panel B reports results of the equity risk regressions. The default risk coefficient is significant and 
negative in all regressions, indicating that higher distress risk is associated with lower equity risk before 
and after purging effects of the control variables.12 The results offer strong support for a risk-shifting 
hypothesis.  
3.3. Time trends in equity beta 
 Favara et al. (2012) contend that equity risk falls as the likelihood of strategic default rises. The 
prospect of favorable debt renegotiations leads to higher expected proceeds for shareholders, and, in the 
process, equity risk becomes less affected by the uncertainty of the firm’s cash flow. To test this 
hypothesis, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression for stocks in the highest default risk 
quintile:  
 
1 2 i i i iBeta Cash Flow Controls         (6) 
where Beta is a time-varying or conditional beta discussed earlier. Controls is a vector of control 
variables consisting of Cash, Sales Growth, R&D, and Dividend Yields. 
2   is a row vector of coefficients 
                                                 
 12 George and Hwang (2010) and Chava and Purnanandam (2010) show that the negative relation between default 
risk and future returns is concentrated in periods following 1980. To address the possibility of a time period bias, we 
conduct subperiod tests: January 1971 - December 1980 and January 1981 - December 2014. For tests on equity 
returns, slopes on DR are significant in both subperiods, but are lower in the earlier period, -0.140, t-statistic = -2.23, 
versus -0.194, t-statistic = -4.28. For tests on equity risk, the DR slope is significant only in the post-1980 period, -0.44, 
t-statistic = -8.69 (versus 0.103, t-statistic = 0.98 for the earlier period). For specific results see our online appendix. 
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for the control variables. The regression is repeated every month, producing monthly estimates of the 
coefficients.  
 The estimated coefficients for all months produce a time series of equity risk sensitivities, β1, to cash 
flow in the highest distress portfolio. Time trends are estimated by regressing each estimated coefficient 
in equation (6) on a time trend variable and four lags (McLean (2011)). The lags control for 
autocorrelation in each coefficient. The time variable ranges from 1 in January of 1971 through 528 in 
December of 2014. The strategic action hypothesis implies that there is a negative and significant time 
trend in the cash flow coefficient.    
|Please insert Table 5| 
 Results are reported in Table 5. The Cash Flow coefficient trend is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that the average sensitivity of equity risk to Cash Flow increases during the sample 
period. The time parameter is equal to 0.09 basis points with a t-statistic of 3.16. The Durbin-Watson 
statistic cannot detect any serial correlation after four lags. Overall, these findings fail to support the 
hypothesis of strategic shareholder action on equity return or for equity risk. The results are robust with 
respect to alternative equity risk measures, such as CAPM betas or Fama and French three-factor betas 
estimated using a rolling window from months t-60 through t-1.    
3.4. The effect of real options  
 The option to accept, reject, or postpone new projects and to change or end current projects is 
valuable, and may be particularly relevant for the risk-shifting hypothesis. Managers may take advantage 
of difficulties of determining real option values and may shift equity risks to bondholders. Patterned after 
Da et al. (2012), we run the following regressions on stock returns and time-varying equity betas, 
respectively:  
  i i
dm O
i
ARet a OP Ret    (7) 
  dm OAi i ibeta b OP beta    (8) 
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where Ret denotes excess future t+1 month returns, beta is the stock’s equity beta in month t+1, OPdm is 
the vector of cross-sectionally demeaned real option proxies BM, IR (idiosyncratic risk relative to the 
CAPM), asset growth (the year-over-year percent change in total assets), and ROA (net income relative to 
the firm’s total assets). RetOA and betaOA are residuals that purge the effects of real options from Ret and 
beta, respectively.  
 Results of the real options test are similar to those presented in Table 4. For instance, for the test on 
equity returns, the DR coefficient in the full model specification (bottom set of results in each Panel of 
Table 4) equals-0.195 (t-statistic = -7.91), which matches closely with -0.181 reported in Panel A of 
Table 4. Also, for the test on equity betas, the DR coefficient equals -0.025 (t-statistic = -15.62), which is 
identical to the result reported in Panel B Table 4. Therefore, negative relations between equity returns 
and equity risks are maintained after considering the effects of real options.  
3.5. The effect of illiquidity 
 We address the concern that default risk may serve as a proxy of illiquidity, whereby lower returns in 
high default risk stocks may be caused by price corrections. To address illiquidity concerns, we conduct 
an event-time analysis. For each month, we form five value-weighted portfolios based on default 
probability, and track each portfolio’s performance over a subsequent 12-month period. Abnormal returns 
are derived relative to the Fama-French-Carhart 4-factor model. All factor loadings are estimated by 
regressing monthly excess returns on Fama and French (1992, 1996) and Carhart (1997) momentum 
factors using the prior five-years of monthly returns with a minimum of 36 months. Abnormal returns are 
calculated as the return net of post-formation predicted returns using updated factors for each month. 
Results are illustrated in Figure 2. 
 If our earlier results of a negative relation between equity returns and distress risk are caused by price 
convergence of high default risk firms to fundamental value, then long-term default portfolio performance 
should converge. However, Figure 2 shows that low default risk firms consistently perform better than 
high default risk firms over 12 months after portfolio formation. Therefore, our results are robust to the 
possibility that our default risk measure is merely a proxy for illiquidity.  
16 
 
|Please insert Figure 2| 
3.6. Risk-shifting incentives  
 To further analyze whether the distress puzzle is attributed to risk-shifting behaviors, we test distress 
risk effects in different samples based on risk-shifting incentives or constraints. We examine conditions 
under which effects of distress risk on equity returns (or equity risk) are likely to be more pronounced.  
According to the risk-shifting hypothesis, in their attempts to maximize shareholder value, managers may 
pursue actions harmful to creditors, especially when firms are in distress. The agency costs associated 
with debt may be affected by various incentives or constraints. Specifically, we examine the effects of 
coverage by a credit rating agency, the existence of convertible debt in the firm’s capital structure, and the 
existence of equity-based compensation to CEOs. We address each incentive below.  
 If low equity returns in high distress firms are caused by risk-shifting behavior, distress effects should 
be weaker in firms covered by credit agencies. To obtain a credit rating, a firm must submit to the 
scrutiny of rating agencies, which verify the firm’s ability to meet its financial obligations. Healy and 
Palepu (2001) argue that information intermediaries such as rating agencies serve as outside monitors, 
restricting managerial misconduct, and reducing agency problems for stakeholders.   
 The existence of convertible bonds in the firm’s capital structure helps align management incentives 
more closely with bondholders, thereby reducing risk-shifting incentives. In his research of investment 
risk incentives, Green (1984) develops a model emphasizing the role of convertible debt for firms 
attempting to maximize the value of the residual claim of shareholders. In his model, Green (1984) proves 
that convertible bond contracts are particularly suitable for controlling risk incentive problems. Because 
convertible bonds are exchangeable into equity, the risk-shifting hypothesis predicts actions benefitting 
shareholders at the expense of bondholders will be reduced for firms with convertible debt (also see 
Barnea et al. (1980) and Ozerturk (2002)). Data on convertible debt are available through the 
COMPUSTAT annual file.    
 Brander and Poitevin (1992) and Ertugrul and Hegde (2008) find that managerial compensation 
structures can affect risk-shifting behavior. In particular, equity-based compensation aligns interests of 
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managers and shareholders and intensifies risk-shifting behavior. We test this conjecture using CEO 
equity holding data (the value of executive stock and option holdings) obtained from COMPUSTAT-
Capital IQ Execucomp Annual Compensation.13 Execucomp contains data on companies from the S&P 
1500 Plus.  
 We repeat the Fama-MacBeth regressions for the full model specification from Table 4 with the 
addition of dummy variables designed to measure the effects of the three risk-shifting incentives. For 
simplicity, we report just the results for the slope coefficients on DR and the DR interaction term. The 
three tests are conducted separately. Results are reported for the slopes on DR and for the interaction 
terms of DR multiplied by each dummy variable: CR = 1 if the firm is covered by a credit rating agency, 
CB = 1 if the firm’s capital structure includes convertible debt, CEO = 1 if the CEO’s equity holdings 
exceed the sample mean.  
|Please insert Table 6| 
 Results are reported in Table 6. For stocks in default risk quintile 5, the effect of the binary credit 
rating variable equals 0.035% (e.g., 5 × 0.007%) per month or 0.42% annually. The effects of the 
remaining risk shifting incentives are more meaningful. For instance, for firms in the high default quintile, 
equity returns are higher by 0.085% per month, or 1.02% annually, for firms with convertible debt, and 
are lower by 0.26% per month, or 3.23% annually for firms with CEO equity holdings higher than 
average. Results indicate that credit rating and convertible debt reduce the effects of distress risk on 
equity returns, and that high ownership of the firm’s equity by CEOs increases the effects of distress risk 
on equity returns. These results have clear implications for policymakers, investors, and managers, 
especially in regards equity-based compensation. In fact, Edmans and Liu (2011) highlight a potential tool 
to reduce risk-shifting by increasing the proportion of debt in executive compensation. The authors show 
                                                 
 13 The Execucomp data are from 1992 to 2014. In 2006, the FAS123R changed reporting requirements. After 
eliminating data after 2006, primary conclusions from our tests remained unchanged. CEO equity ownership equals 
stock grants multiplied by stock price plus the Black-Scholes value of options.  
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debt compensation can be both an effective means to increase liquidation values and to reduce risk-
shifting.  
3.7. Credit spreads and distress risk 
 The risk-shifting hypothesis predicts distress risk reduces equity risk and increases debt risk. The 
above sections confirm a negative relationship between equity return (risk) and distress risk. In this 
section, we further test the risk-shifting hypothesis for bond data. Bond data, supplied by the Trade 
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), include FINRA over-the-counter corporate bond market 
real-time price information, including bond prices, yields to maturity, maturity dates, and volume.14  
 We construct monthly credit spreads in two steps. First, we obtain monthly yield data from the last 
trading observation of each month. We then use monthly treasury security data from FRED published by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis as a risk-free rate. Second, we derive credit spreads equal to the 
difference between the yield to maturities on corporate bonds and the corresponding maturity treasury 
rate.15 Following Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), we only include bonds with more than one year of 
remaining time to maturity. We exclude bonds issued by financial and utility firms and bonds with 
missing bond data. The final sample includes 509,385 monthly observations for 21,118, and unique bonds 
for 1,695 unique firms. 
|Please insert Table 7| 
 Table 7 presents the results of the Fama and MacBeth tests of corporate credit spreads. The 
independent variables are DR, Amt, Year, Rating, Std, ROA, and Runup. Amt is the log value of the bond 
face value. Year denotes the number of years to maturity. Rating denotes the credit rating of the corporate 
bond, following Avramov et al. (2007) transformations. Specifically, AAA takes a value of 1 and D is 
scored with the value 22. Thus, firms with lower credit ratings and higher credit risk correspond with 
                                                 
 14 TRACE consolidates bond prices daily data for July 1, 2002 through December 31, 2014, representing 100% 
of OTC activity and over 99% of total U.S. corporate bond market activity in over 30,000 securities. 
 15 We match the corporate bond data as closely as possible to the corresponding treasury rate. For corporate bonds 
with a period to maturity of more than 30 years, we use the 30-year constant maturity rate.  
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higher numerical scores. Std denotes the standard deviation of prior 12-month stock returns. ROA is net 
income divided by total assets. Runup is the percentage change in equity prices over the past year.  
 Results show that the credit spreads increase 0.585% (t-statistic = 10.56) when a firm moves into a 
higher default risk quintile. The DR effect drops but remains significant after controlling for bond and 
stock characteristics, as well as proxies designed to capture effects of shareholder strategic actions. All 
slopes have the expected signs. ROA often lacks significance, which should not be surprising because the 
regression also includes DR and Rating. Most importantly, our tests offer further support for the risk-
shifting hypothesis and cast doubt on the strategic action hypothesis. 
 Our results provide clear evidence of negative relations of equity returns and equity risk with distress 
risk. Results remain strong after controlling for effects of shareholder actions and risk-shifting incentives. 
We show that credit spreads increase with distress risk, after controlling for various characteristics of the 
bond issues, as well as shareholder action effects. Credit spreads rise and equity risks fall as default 
probability rises, offering further support for the risk-shifting hypothesis.  
4. Conclusions 
 We examine causes of the distress puzzle, aiming to reconcile the negative relation between financial 
distress and equity returns. In our cross-sectional regressions, we show that financial distress serves as a 
negative and significant predictor of future stock returns and equity risk, after controlling for stock 
characteristics related to firm size, book-to-market, and momentum, as well as proxies for effects of 
shareholder strategic actions. We find that high default risk firms tend to overinvest, destroy value, and 
exhaust their cash flows relative to low default risk firms. These effects are more pronounced in high 
growth opportunity firms and in hard-to-value firms. In support of the risk-shifting hypothesis, effects of 
distress risk on equity returns and risks vary significantly in the presence of different incentives or 
supervision mechanics. In particular, distress risk effects are higher for firms with no credit ratings or 
convertible debt and in firms where CEOs have above-average equity holdings.   
 Findings show that higher distress risk is associated with higher credit spreads, after controlling for 
stock and bond characteristics, as well as shareholder action proxies. Overall, our findings show that 
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higher distress risk is associated with lower equity betas, lower equity returns, and higher credit spreads. 
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Summary statistics of the default probability 
This table reports the summary statistics of default probability (in percentages) presented by Campbell et 
al. (2008). The sample period runs from January of 1971 to December of 2014. The table reports the annual 
average of default probability and corresponding historical events. N denotes the number of firms per year. 
Year N Default Probability Historical Event (Peak) 
1971 761 0.014  
1972 1,348 0.010  
1973 1,483 0.013 Oil Crisis and Stock Market Crash 
1974 1,488 0.009  
1975 1,486 0.019  
1976 1,414 0.029 Secondary Banking Crisis of United Kingdom 
1977 1,532 0.021  
1978 1,491 0.035  
1979 1,456 0.058 The 1979 Energy Crisis and the U.S. Recession 
1980 1,407 0.027  
1981 1,388 0.049 Latin American Debt Crisis and the U.S. Double 
1982 2,090 0.043  
1983 2,535 0.055  
1984 2,708 0.119  
1985 2,648 0.166  
1986 2,666 0.222  
1987 2,830 0.247  
1988 2,752 0.435 Black Monday 1987 
1989 2,653 0.558 United Stated Saving & Loan Crisis 
1990 2,524 0.574 Japanese Asset Pricing Bubble Collapsed 
1991 2,557 0.529 Black Wednesday 
1992 2,845 0.530  
1993 3,168 0.531  
1994 3,516 0.616 Economic Crisis in Mexico 
1995 3,682 0.618  
1996 3,968 0.627  
1997 4,241 0.680 Asian Financial Crisis 
1998 4,172 0.829 Russian Financial Crisis 
1999 3,952 0.914  
2000 3,931 1.005 The early 2000s recession 
2001 3,554 1.801 The U.S. dot-com Bubble Crisis 
2002 3,250 1.311  
2003 3,183 0.993  
2004 3,184 0.769  
2005 3,139 0.812  
2006 3,161 2.608  
2007 3,110 3.421  
2008 2,972 6.634 The U.S. Financial Crisis 
2009 2,784 11.894  
2010 2,857 5.678 The European sovereign debt crisis 
2011 2,686 3.650  
2012 2,548 4.798  
2013 2,545 3.706  






Summary statistics of firm characteristics and default probability  
This table reports summary statistics of firm characteristics and default probability. The sample period 
spans January 1971 - December 2014. For each month, observations are sorted by default probability into 
five quintiles. Panel A reports summary statistics of firm characteristics for the entire sample. Panel B 
reports summary statistics of firm characteristics based on the quintiles. Panel C reports monthly excess 
returns (over the 30-day Treasury bill return), risk-adjusted returns, characteristic-adjusted returns, time 
varying beta, and conditional beta. Risk-adjusted returns and characteristic-adjusted returns are based on 
t+1 month returns. Size is natural log of market capitalization in millions. BM is the book-to-market ratio, 
calculated as the book value of stockholder equity at year t-1 divided by the market value of stockholder 
equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. These variables are matched with monthly returns from July of year t 
to June of year t+1. MOM is stock momentum, defined as stock returns over the prior year ranging from 
-12 months to -2 months prior to portfolio formation. Illiquidity denotes Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity 
measure for the past 12 months of daily trading data. Leverage denotes total liabilities over total assets. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Firm Characteristics 
 Mean Median Std Min Max 
Default Probability 1.055 0.002 9.384 0 100 
Size 5.009 4.927 2.033 0.834 8.586 
BM 0.862 0.659 0.669 0.072 2.904 
MOM 0.084 0.025 0.434 -0.624 1.030 
Illiquidity  0.153 0.001 0.384 0 1.736 
Leverage 0.482 0.485 0.215 0.090 1.156 
 












Default Probability 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 5.264 
Size 5.448 5.788 5.468 4.715 3.627 
BM 0.616 0.638 0.805 1.030 1.219 
MOM 0.305 0.169 0.095 0.009 -0.161 
Illiquidity  0.259 0.244 0.292 0.384 0.570 
Leverage 0.299 0.421 0.499 0.551 0.642 
 












Returns (%) 0.948 0.588 0.573 0.610 0.303 
Char-adjusted Returns (%) 0.850 0.533 0.538 0.676 0.547 
CAPM Alpha (%) 0.338 0.027 0.002 0.001 -0.441 
3-factor Alpha (%) 0.528 0.116 -0.009 -0.115 -0.732 
4-factor Alpha (%) 0.318 0.086 0.129 0.106 -0.241 
5-factor Alpha (%) 0.337 0.093 0.138 0.181 -0.285 
Time-varying Beta 0.867 0.884 0.848 0.812 0.775 





Investment, profitability, cash flow, and default probability 
This table presents the relationships between firm fundamentals and default probability. The sample period 
runs from 1971 to 2014. Panel A reports results based on quintiles (DR) sorted by default probability. Panel B 
reports results based on quintiles that are first sorted by the market equity-to-book equity ratio (MB) and then 
by default probability. Panel C presents the results based on quintiles that are first sorted by idiosyncratic risk 
(IR) and then by default probability. Investment intensity equals capital expenditures divided by total assets. 
Profitability equals return on equity (ROE). Cash flow is the operating cash flow divided by total assets. For 
each year, observations are sorted into quintiles based on default probability. The table reports the time-series 
averages of Investment Intensity, Profitability, and Cash flow for low and high default quintiles. * denotes a 
10% significance level, ** denotes a 5% significance level, and *** denotes a 1% significance level. 
 
Panel A: Fundamentals by Default Probability Quintiles 
 Low DR High DR High-Low 
Investment Intensity 0.063  0.071   0.008*** 
Profitability 0.157 -0.174  -0.331*** 
Cash Flow  0.276  0.091  -0.185*** 
 
Panel B: Fundamentals Double Sorted by Default Probability and MB Quintiles 
 Low DR High DR High-Low 
Investment Intensity    
Low MB 0.053 0.053  0.000 
High MB 0.081 0.081   0.000 
Difference 0.028*** 0.028***  
Profitability     
Low MB 0.083 -0.114  -0.197*** 
High MB  0.194 -0.472   -0.666*** 
Difference 0.111*** -0.358***  
Cash Flow     
Low MB 0.210 0.064  -0.146*** 
High MB  0.322 0.136  -0.186*** 
Difference 0.112*** 0.072***  
 
Panel C: Fundamentals Double Sorted by Default Probability and IR Quintiles 
 Low DR High DR High-Low 
Investment Intensity     
Low IR 0.051 0.061  0.010*** 
High IR 0.052 0.069  0.017*** 
Difference 0.001*** 0.008***  
Profitability    
Low IR 0.166  0.066 -0.160*** 
High IR  0.069 -0.435 -0.504*** 
Difference -0.097*** -0.501***  
Cash Flow     
Low IR 0.208 0.057 -0.152*** 
High IR  0.307 0.087 -0.220*** 





Fama-MacBeth regressions for equity returns and equity risks 
This table represents the Fama-MacBeth regression of equity risk on distress risk. The dependent variable is either 
equity returns or equity risk. Equity returns are one-month holding period returns minus the risk-free rate, and equity 
risk is the time-varying beta. The independent variables are DR, Cash Flow, Cash, Sales Growth, R&D, DY, 
TANGIBILITY, MBTA, and CURRENT. DR is the quintile of default probability. Size is the log value of market 
capitalization (in millions). BM denotes book-to-market ratios. MOM denotes prior year returns ranging from -12 
months to -2 months. Cash Flow is the operating cash flow divided by total assets. Cash is the cash and short-term 
investment divided by total assets. Sales Growth is the average annual percent change in sales over the last three years. 
R&D denotes research and development costs divided by total assets. DY is the annual dividend per share divided by 
the price per share at the end of the month. MBTA is the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt divided 
by book value of total assets. TANGIBILITY is defined as 1 minus property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. 
CURRENT is the ratio of current liabilities divided by total liabilities. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes 
a 10% significance level, ** denotes a 5% significance level, and *** denotes a 1% significance level. 
 
Panel A: Equity Returns 
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Trends in equity risk sensitivities 
This table reports trends in the equity risk sensitivities of the highest distress risk portfolio (DR=5). The 
equity risk sensitivities are the coefficients from monthly cross-sectional regressions of equity risk on cash 
flow variables: 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽′2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Controls include Cash, Sales Growth, R&D, and DY. The Cash Flow and Control variables are defined in 
Table 4. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes a 10% significance level, ** denotes a 5% 
significance level, and *** denotes a 1% significance level. Durbin-Watson statistics are reported at the 
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Distress effects for subsamples according to credit agency coverage, existence of convertible 
debt, and CEO equity ownership 
This table presents coefficients for the full model in Table 3, with an interaction variable. For each month, 
the sample is divided into two subsamples based on specific criteria. These criteria include whether a firm 
is followed by a credit agency (Panel A, CR = 1 if the firm’s debt has a credit rating), whether a firm has 
convertible bonds (Panel B, CB = 1 if the firm issues convertible bonds), and whether a firm’s CEO has 
equity holdings above the sample median (Panel C, CEO = 1 if CEO holdings are above the sample median). 
DR is the default risk quintile. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes a 10% significance level, ** 
denotes a 5% significance level, and *** denotes a 1% significance level. 
 
Panel A: Credit Agency Coverage 
 DR DR∙CR 










Panel B: Convertible Bonds 
 DR DR∙CB 










Panel B: CEO 
 DR DR∙CEO 














Bond risk and distress risk 
This table presents results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of bond risk on distress risk. The dependent variable is the yield spread between the 
company bond yields and corresponding maturity treasury yields. The independent variables are DR, Amt, Year, Rating, Std, ROA, Runup, MBTA, 
TANGIBILITY, and CURRENT. DR is the quintile of the default probability. Amt is the log value of the bond face value. Year is the number of years 
until maturity. Rating denotes the credit rating of the corporate bond. A high numerical score corresponds with a lower credit rating. Std is the 
standard deviation of the prior 12-month stock return. ROA is the net income over total assets for the firm. Runup is the percentage change in equity 
prices over the past year. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * denotes a 10% significance level, ** denotes a 5% significance level, and *** denotes 






























































































































Investment intensity, ROE, and Cash Flow and over time 
This figure presents the 5-year moving averages of Investment Intensity, Cash Flow, and ROE for the low 




























































Cumulative abnormal returns for each default portfolio  
 
This figure plots the average cumulative abnormal returns of each default portfolio (1 = low default 
portfolio, 5 = high default portfolio). For every month, firms are sorted into five groups based on default 
probability levels. Cumulative abnormal returns are tracked over 12 months. Numbers in the figure denote 
values that are first value-weighted within each portfolio and that are then averaged over the sample period. 
The time period ranges from January 1971 through December 2014. Abnormal returns are calculated 
relative to the Fama-French-Carhart 4 factors. Loadings are estimated from the prior 5-year monthly returns 
with a minimum of 36 months. Abnormal returns are then accumulated over the 12-month post-formation 
period.  
 
 
 
